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Summary
The paper analyzes the multi-channel contribution of Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT) to output and labour productivity growth in eight transition economies of
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), i.e. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia between 1995-2001. The impact of ICT on growth in the new
five EU member countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) was
higher than the average for the former EU-15. Hence, ICT - through both the capital
deepening and TFP growth in ICT-producing sector - contributed to convergence of the level
of income between those countries and the EU-15. This was however not the case for
Bulgaria, Romania, and Russia, where ICT contribution to growth was lower than in the EU-
15. ICT thus led to income deconvergence.
Future growth prospects of the CEE countries, including Russia, will largely depend
on further ICT investments and an ability to ensure their productive use on a macro, industry
and micro level. The paper speculates that ICT capital will have a significant contribution to
long-term growth in Poland, taken as a proxy for other CEE countries, on the level of 15% of
the projected average annual GDP growth of 4% until 2025. This projection does not however
take into account the potential for emergence of new applications of ICT, which could
stimulate further increases in aggregate productivity. Neither does it measure the possible
contribution from TFP growth in ICT sector and from the spillover effects of ICT production
and use.
The paper argues that the potential of ICT will not however be realized without
changes in business models and an increase in the quality of human capital and ICT skills. On
the macrolevel, as indicated by the New Economy Indicator, ICT will not benefit CEE
countries without them making consistent progress in economic, institutional and regulatory
environment.
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1. Introduction
During the 1990’s Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) have contributed
to an acceleration in GDP and labour productivity growth rates in a number of developed
countries, in particular in the US. This has been evidenced by numerous research results on
the impact of ICT on macro, industry and micro-level.
2 In spite of the collapse of the “internet
bubble” and dashed hopes as to the emergence of the so-called “new economy”, the
technological progress spurred by ICT seems not to have been arrested as evidenced by
continued high labour productivity growth rates in the US, which during 2000-02 amounted
on average to 3.4% versus “only” 2.5% in the 1995-2001 period (Economist 2003). Similar
trends have also been witnessed by a number of other developed countries, including Ireland,
Netherlands, Australia, Denmark, and Great Britain (OECD 2004, 2003, and van Ark and
Piatkowski 2004). 
There is however hardly any evidence for the impact of ICT on developing and emerging
economies, including the post-communist countries transitioning from a centrally planned to a
market economy. Among the few publications, IMF (2001) indicates the positive contribution
of ICT production to growth in late 1990’s in selected countries of South-East Asia. Lee and
Khatri (2003) document contributions of ICT capital to growth in the South-East Asian
countries.
3 Piatkowski (2003a, 2004b) provides first estimates, based on growth accounting
methodology, of ICT capital contribution to growth and labour productivity in Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Russia. 
The aim of this paper is to extend the previous research results of the same author to estimate
the overall, multi-channel contribution of ICT to growth and labour productivity in the four
CEE countries of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, the new EU members as of
May 1, 2004, during 1995-2001. Their performance will be juxtaposed against results on ICT
capital contribution to growth in Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Slovenia, EU-15 and the US
in the same period.
In Section 2 the paper briefly describes the methodology. Section 3 analyzes the role of
each of the ICT channels in the catching-up process of the CEE countries with the EU-15.
Section 4 relates the aggregate contribution of ICT to output and labour productivity growth
to economic, institutional and regulatory determinants of diffusion and productive use of ICT.
In Section 5 the author - in order to get a feel for the potential of ICT for accelerating
catching-up in Poland and in the remaining CEE countries – speculates on the contribution of
ICT to output growth in Poland during 2002-25. Section 6 concludes and presents policy
recommendations.
2. Accounting for Overall Impact of ICT on Output Growth and Labour Productivity
The methodology of measuring the contribution of ICT to growth and productivity is based
on original work by Solow (1957) and Jorgenson and Griliches (1968) and later extended by
inter alia Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000). Since ICT products and
services are both outputs from the ICT industries and inputs into ICT-using industries, ICT
can impact economic growth through four major channels:
                                                
2 Macro research on USA: Jorgenson (2001), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Oliner and Sichel (2002), Stiroh
(2002a); on the EU-15 countries: Colecchia and Schreyer (2001), van Ark et. al. (2002), Daveri (2002), Jalava
and Pohjola (2002). On the industry level in the US and the EU: Stiroh (2002b), Timmer et. al. (2003) and
OECD (2003). On a microlevel in the US and the EU: Brynjolfsson i Hitt (1996, 2000) and OECD (2004, 2003).
3 Zhen-Wei and Pitt (2003) provide a useful literature review.3
1. production of ICT goods and services, which directly contributes to the aggregate value
added generated in an economy; 
2. increase in total factor productivity (TFP) of production in ICT sector, which
contributes to aggregate TFP growth in an economy;
3. use of ICT capital as in input in the production of other goods and services;
4. contribution to economy-wide TFP from increase in productivity in non-ICT producing
sectors induced by the production and use of ICT (spillover effects);
To measure the overall impact of ICT on growth, it is best to express the aggregate production
function in the following form:
) , , ( ) , (
0
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where, at any given time t, aggregate value added Y is assumed to consist of ICT goods and
services ICT – Y
ICT
t, as well as of other production Y
0
t. These outputs are produced from
aggregate inputs consisting of ICT capital Ct,, other (i.e. non-ICT) physical capital Kt,, and
labor Lt. TFP (total factor productivity) is here represented in the Hicks neutral or output
augmenting form by parameter A.
Assuming that constant returns to scale prevail in production and that all production factors
are paid their marginal products, equation (1) can be expressed in the following form:
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∧ indicates the rate of change and the time index t has been suppressed for the
simplicity of exposition. The weights wICT and w0 denote the nominal output shares of ICT
and non-ICT production, respectively. The weights sum to one similarly as the weights vICT,
v0, and v L, which represent the nominal shares of ICT capital, non-ICT capital, and labor,
respectively. 
Denoting the total employment by H(t) and labor productivity by Y(t)/H(t), the equation (2)
can then be re-arranged to measure the contribution of ICT investment to growth in labour
productivity
A H K v H C v H Y t ICT ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ˆ ˆ
0 0 + − + − = −
∧
(3)
As shown in the above equation, there are three sources of growth in labor productivity:
ICT capital deepening, i.e. increase in ICT capital services per employed person, non-ICT
capital deepening, and exogenous growth of TFP, which is derived from increase in
productivity in ICT-producing, ICT-using and non-ICT sector. 
3. Have ICT Contributed to faster Catching-up of the CEE Countries?
The contribution of ICT to the catching-up of CEE countries with the EU-15, or – in other
words – to the convergence process between the two groups of countries, can be analyzed
from the viewpoint of the four channels, through which ICT can impact output and labour
productivity growth. The following four subsections look separately at each of the channels.4
3.1 Contribution of ICT Production
The direct contribution of ICT production – as show in the left hand side of equation (2) –
can be estimated through multiplication of the nominal share of ICT production in GDP (wICT)
by a real growth rate of the value of ICT production (
ICT Y ˆ ): 
0
0 ˆ ˆ ˆ Y w Y w Y
ICT
ICT + =   (4)
where weights wICT and w0 denote nominal shares in GDP of ICT and non-ICT production,
respectively.
Table 1 and Figure 1 show an average contribution of ICT production to output growth in
the CEE countries between 1995-2001 in comparison to the EU-15 and the US.
4 ICT
production in absolute terms had the largest contribution to GDP growth in Hungary, USA,
and Czech Republic. The contribution of ICT sector to GDP growth in Poland and Slovakia
was much lower. In relative terms, the contribution of ICT production to growth was higher in
Hungary and Czech Republic than in the US and the EU. Thus ICT production helped the two
CEE countries to converge on the EU-15. This was not the case for Poland and Slovakia,
which reported lower relative contributions to growth. It seems that the size of FDI inflows to
the ICT sector has been the main driver of the difference in the value of ICT production
among the CEE countries.
5
Table 1: The contribution of ICT-producing sector, ICT-using sector and non-ICT sector to




ICT producing sector 0,51 1,01 0,75 0,99 0,28 0,37
Share in GDP growth 19,4% 27,1% 36,6% 43,2% 6,8% 12,1%
ICT using sector  0,93 1,83 1,55 0,20 1,56 1,31
Non-ICT sector 1,20 0,89 -0,25 0,89 2,37 1,36
GDP growth 2,64 3,73 2,06 2,30 4,22 3,04
Contribution of ICT producing
sector: US ICT deflator
0,69 1,01 0,92 1,38 0,56 0,47
Share in GDP growth 26,1% 27,1% 44,6% 59,9% 13,3% 15,5%
Contribution of ICT producing
sector: ICT national deflators  0,53 1,01 0,74 1,27 0,40 0,36
Share in GDP growth 20,0% 27,1% 36,1% 54,9% 9,6% 11,7%
                                                
4 Data on value added in fixed and current prices and on ICT deflators are based on the “60 Industry Database of
the Groningen Growth and Development Centre” available at http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/. ICT producing
sector is defined on the basis of the OECD classification OECD (2001b). Definitions of ICT-using and non-ICT
sectors are based on van Ark, Inklaar and McGuckin (2002). 
5 Although, as illustrated by the recent withdrawal of IBM from ICT manufacturing in Hungary and transfer of
its one-billion-dollar-plus-in-revenue manufacturing plant to South-East Asia (Gaspar et al. 2004), ICT
production in CEE countries seem to rest on a shaky ground and is subject to fierce cost competition from other
parts of the world, in particular China and South-East Asia.5
Note: GDP growth rates based on the GGDC database
6. Real estate has been excluded from both GDP and Total
persons engaged for all countries. Based on US ICT deflators excluding semiconductors and computers.
Source: based on dataset from Van Ark and Piatkowski (2004) and Groningen Growth and Development Centre
(GGDC), 60-Industry Database, http://www.ggdc.net
Figure 1: The contribution of ICT-producing sector, ICT-using sector and non-ICT sector to
GDP growth in CEE countries, EU-15 and USA, 1995-2001 average (based on US ICT
deflator excluding semiconductors and computers).
Note: as in Table 1
Source: as in Table 1
Most EU-15 and all CEE countries do not report separate quality-adjusted deflators for
ICT production, which would adequately reflect rapid decreases in prices of ICT products and
services and continuous increase in their quality.
7  Failure to take account of the changes in
quality of ICT products would lead to a substantial underestimation of their real contribution
to growth. Hence, in light of the lack of national hedonic ICT deflators, this paper relies on
hedonic ICT production deflators for the US ICT industry corrected for the general inflation
level in each country through the so-called “price harmonization method” developed by
                                                
6 GDP growth rates in the GGDC database do not usually conform to official statistics as in order to ensure
cross-country consistency the GGDC dataset uses chain-weighted indices for all aggregated real output series
rather than fixed-weight (Laspeyres) indices used by the national statistical offices. The latter due to changes in
the structure of the economy may result in a significant substitution bias. More details in van Ark and Piatkowski
(2004).
 
7 Only France, Denmark, Sweden, Kanada and USA publish ICT hedonic deflators. For detailed discussion on
the methodology of hedonic prices please refer to OECD (2000) and Mulligen (2002).6
Schreyer (2000) and then utilized by inter alia Van Ark and Piatkowski (2004). However,
since – as opposed to the US ICT sector – the ICT production in CEE countries mostly
comprises of household electronics rather than semiconductors and computers, changes in
prices of the latter were excluded from the deflator to better reflect the real structure of ICT
production in CEE countries. 
Table 1 also presents results based on the harmonized US ICT deflator and national non-
hedonic ICT deflators. Based on these deflators, the contribution of ICT production to growth
is higher for all CEE countries. Hence, these results will represent the upper bound limit for
the contribution of ICT production to growth in CEE countries.
A slightly different picture of the convergence process transpires from a comparison of
ICT production contribution to labour productivity growth (Table 2 and Figure 2). While
again the absolute contributions of ICT production are highest in Hungary, the US, and Czech
Republic, the relative contributions in the CEE countries, with the exception of Hungary, are
much lower than in the EU and the US.
8 It is mostly due to high labour productivity growth
rates in the CEE countries which resulted from deep structural reforms, transfers of
technology, higher capacity utilization, improvement in managerial and business skills,
increase in human capital and higher macroeconomic stability. If it were possible to
disentangle the contribution to labour productivity growth of the one-off positive productivity
effects of structural reforms (i.e. privatization and liquidation of inefficient state-owned firms,
emergence of new, more productive firms) and cyclical effects of an economic recovery
which followed the 1990-93 transitional recession (Kolodko 2000), the role of ICT production
in labour productivity growth in the four CEE countries would be much higher. For Poland
and Slovakia, however, this effect would not be significant enough to make up for the
difference in relative ICT production contribution to labour productivity growth. One could
therefore argue that in Poland and Slovakia, as opposed to Hungary and Czech Republic, the
ICT-production contributed to divergence rather than convergence with the income levels of
the EU and the US.
                                                
8 It is worth mentioning that the level and growth rates in in labour productivity in the ICT producing and the
ICT using sector in the CEE countries during 1993-2001 was significantly higher than in the non-ICT sector
(van Ark and Piatkowski 2004). This evidence points to the important contribution of ICT to labour productivity
on the industry level in the CEE countries. 7
Table 2: Contributions to labour productivity growth (GDP per person employed) of ICT-
















GDP growth 1,34 2,19 2,83 2,41 3,33 2,50
ICT Producing Industries 0,58 0,98 0,68 0,68 0,21 0,15
As share of GDP growth (in %) 43,6% 44,5% 23,9% 28,4% 6,3% 5,9%
ICT Using Industries 0,46 1,17 1,55 0,54 1,57 0,40
Non-ICT Industries 0,29 0,06 0,60 1,19 1,56 1,96
ICT Producing Manufacturing
Using US ICT deflators
0,07 - 0,33 0,90 0,11 0,19
Using national ICT deflators 0,13 - 0,16 0,56 0,19 (0,93)
Note: Real estate has been excluded from both GDP and Total persons engaged for all countries. EU-15 and US
for 1995-2001; Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia for 1993-2001.
Source: based on van Ark and Piatkowski (2004), Table 7 and underlying dataset.
Figure 2: Contributions to labour productivity growth of ICT-producing, ICT-using and non-
ICT industries in CEE countries, EU-15 and the US (based on US ICT deflator excluding
semiconductors and computers)
Note: as in Table 2
Source: as in Table 28
3.2 The Contribution of TFP Growth in ICT Production
Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2002) provide methodology for measuring TFP growth at the
industry level. The methodology is based on the industry production function:
) , , , ( T X L K f Y j j j j = (5)
where Y is industry gross output, K is capital input, L is labour input, and X is intermediate
input, and T is an indicator of efficiency, all for industry j. PYj, PKj , PLj, and PHj denote the
prices for outputs and three inputs, respectively. All variables are indexed by time, yet the
subscript  t is eliminated for clarity of notation. Under the usual assumptions of constant
returns to scale and competitive markets, a translog index of TFP growth can be defined as:
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where 
_
v is the two-period average share of the input in the value of nominal output. 
Having calculated the industry-level TFP growth rates, the contribution of each industry’s
TFP growth rates to aggregate TFP growth in the whole economy can be estimated on the
basis of Domar model through weighing the TFP growth rate in a particular industry with the
so-called Domar weights, i.e. a ratio of gross output of a particular industry to aggregate GDP
(Domar 1961). Domar weights can be measured as gross output of a particular industry
adjusted - on the basis of input-output tables - for intra-industry deliveries (Timmer et al.
2003).
There is a relative wealth of evidence for the substantial role of TFP growth in ICT-
producing sector in enhancing the aggregate TFP growth rate, particularly in the US
(Jorgenson 2001, Oliner and Sichel 2002 and Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh 2002). Timmer et al
(2003) provide first estimates for TFP growth in ICT producing sector in the EU in
comparison to the US. Since on average the size of ICT industries in the EU, as measured by
the share in GDP, is much smaller than in the US, the contribution of ICT industries to
aggregate TFP growth in the former was lower than in the latter. 
Alas, due to insufficient data on industry-level capital service input measures and deflators
for both input and output, Timmer et al. (2003) estimates for the EU ICT producing sector
TFP contribution to aggregate TFP growth are based on TFP growth rates in the US ICT
industries.
9 It is a very rough assumption, but Timmer et al. (2003) argue that given the highly
competitive nature of the global ICT market, there is no overarching rationale for TFP growth
rates in ICT sector in the EU to be different than in the US. In addition, this approach allows
comparison of ICT sector TFP impact on aggregate TFP due to different output shares of ICT
industries in each country.
An alternative method of TFP growth measurement is based on changes in industry level
value added. In this approach, productivity growth is simply calculated as the difference
between total output and total input growth:
                                                
9  Timmer et al. (ibid.) estimate the contributions of three industries: office, accounting and computing
equipment, communication equipment and electronic components (ISIC rev 3 industry numbers 30, 322 and 321
respectively). Due to lack of data, the computer services industry, including software, is excluded.  US TFP
growth rates for IT production are based on Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2002, Table 18), while TFP growth rates
in communication industry are based on Timmer et al. (ibid.) estimates based on Corrado (2003) and Aizcorbe,
Flamm and Kurshid (2002).9
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where vai,t denotes value added, li,t and k,t t represent labour and capital, respectively, while α
stands for the labor compensation share in total income.
In comparison to the methodology based on Domar weights, this approach however fails to
appropriately identify the role of rapidly declining prices of intermediate inputs such as
semiconductors, which are widely used in ICT production (Jorgenson 2001 remarks that
semiconductors represent almost half of a cost of a standard computer). Hence, in the context
of ICT industry, the first approach based on gross output and Domar weights seems to be
more appropriate.
Since data from existing input-output tables for the CEE countries is not sufficient to
calculate the Domar weights
10, the only way to get any estimate of the contribution of TFP
growth in ICT producing industry to aggregate TFP growth is to make an assumption that the
ratio between ICT sector value added and Domar weights for the EU-15 is also the same for
the four CEE countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and that – like in
Timmer et al. (2003) - the TFP growth rates in ICT sector in CEE countries are the same as in
the US ICT sector.
11 Since, however, none of the CEE countries produces semiconductors and
microprocessors, which have recorded the highest TFP growth rates, and because most of the
ICT production in CEE countries comprises of household electronics, it seems reasonable to
assume that the TFP growth rate in CEE countries in “electronic components” (ISIC 321,
which includes mostly semiconductors and microprocessors) will be equal to the TFP growth
rate for “telecommunications equipment” (ISIC 322). The comparability of results between
CEE and EU-15 is one of the main benefits of this approach. The obvious shortcoming is the
simplifying assumption underlying the calculations. Hence, the estimated results give only a
very rough measure of the ICT sector contribution to aggregate TFP growth. However, along
with the continued progress in availability of data, more precise calculations should be
possible.
Table 3 and Figure 3 show estimates of the contribution of TFP growth in ICT producing
sector to aggregate TFP growth in CEE countries, EU-15 and the US. It transpires that in
absolute terms ICT sector in Hungary and the US had the largest contribution to overall TFP
growth at the level of 0.44 of a percentage point. The contributions in other three CEE
countries were much smaller, particularly in Poland and Slovakia (less than 0.1 of a
percentage point). This mostly reflects the much smaller size of the ICT sector in these two
countries as measured by the share of ICT sector value added (defined as above as ISIC 30,
321 and 322) in total GDP: 0.49% in the Czech Republic, 0.26% in Poland and 0,29% in
Slovakia. Likewise, in relative terms, ICT sector contribution to TFP growth was the lowest
in Poland and Slovakia (4% and 3%, respectively) while highest in the Czech Republic and
Hungary, where it reached 20% and 19% of the total TFP growth, respectively. Quite
interestingly, the relative contribution of ICT sector in the EU-15 amounted to 59% of total
TFP growth. This result should however be interpreted as an evidence that non-ICT sectors of
                                                
10 The I/O tables for the CEE countries are based on the product rather than industry classification. The former
classification does not allow proper accounting for the intra-industry deliveries and hence the exact measurement
of the Domar weights is not possible.
11 The assumption about the equal ratio of value added to Domar weights implies that intra-industry deliveries in
the total output of the ICT industry are the same for the CEE countries as for the EU-15 average.10
the EU-15 economies reported very low or even negative TFP growth rates rather than that
the ICT sector was the driver of productivity growth in these countries.
Table 3: The contribution of TFP growth in ICT sector to aggregate TFP in CEE countries,
EU-15 and the UE, 1995-2001 average
Share in total value added (in %) UE-15 USA
Czech Rep. 
Hungary  Poland Slovakia
ICT production (total) 0,68 1,48 0,49 1,16 0,26 0,29
Computers (30) 0,23 0,41 0,08 0,56 0,09 0,07
Electronic components (321) 0,17 0,65 0,24 0,33 0,03 0,13
Communications equipment (322) 0,28 0,41 0,17 0,26 0,15 0,09
Domar weights (in %)
ICT production (total) 2,07 3,0 1,3 3,5 0,8 0,8
Computers (30) 0,8 0,9 0,29 1,99 0,30 0,25
Electronic components (321) 0,4 1,3 0,56 0,78 0,06 0,30
Communications equipment (322) 0,8 0,8 0,49 0,74 0,42 0,26
TFP growth (in %)
Computers (30) 16,8 16,8 16,8 16,8 16,8 16,8
Electronic components (321) 18 18 7,2 7,2 7,2 7,2
Communications equipment (322) 7,2 7,2 7,2 7,2 7,2 7,2
Contribution to aggregate TFP growth (in % points)
ICT production (total) 0,26 0,44 0,12 0,44 0,09 0,08
Computers (30) 0,13 0,15 0,05 0,33 0,05 0,04
Electronic components (321) 0,07 0,23 0,04 0,06 0,00 0,02
Communications equipment (322) 0,06 0,06 0,04 0,05 0,03 0,02
Aggregate TFP growth 0,31 1,05 0,62 2,38 2,05 2,75
Share of ICT in aggregate TFP
growth 59% 55% 20% 19% 4% 3%
Notes: ICT sector defined as a sum of “Computers” (30), “Electronic Components” (321) and “Communications
Equipment” (322). TFP growth for „Electronic components” (321) in CEE countries was assumed to equal TFP
growth in „Telecommunications equipment” (322).
Source: Timmer et al. (2003) for industry-level TFP growth rates. Van Ark and Piatkowski (2004) for aggregate
TFP growth rates. GGDC database for shares of ICT sectors in total value added, 1995-2001 average.
Figure 3: The contribution of TFP growth in ICT sector and non-ICT sectors to aggregate
TFP in CEE countries, EU-15 and the UE, 1995-2001 average, in %-points
Notes: as in Table 3.11
Source: as in Table 3.
The above results can be juxtaposed against estimates of ICT sector contribution to
aggregate TFP growth based on the alternative value added methodology. Here however the
data for the CEE countries is quite scarce, particularly on the value of industry-level fixed
capital stocks. The data on the industry-level gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), which
could be used to construct a measure of capital stock on the basis of the perpetual inventory
method, is also not sufficient. It is however possible to calculate TFP growth rates for the ICT
sector in Poland on the basis of data published by the Polish Central Statistical Office in
various editions of the “Yearbooks of Industry Statistics”. 
Table 4 shows the 1995-2001 average annual TFP growth in the Polish ICT sector,
calculated according to equation (7). It turns out that the ICT industries recorded TFP growth
rates significantly higher than the average for total manufacturing. Similar results have also
been reported by Kolasa and Żółkiewski (2003). Based on data on the share of value added in
total GDP (Table 3 for industries 30 and 32 [321 and 322 taken together]) and TFP growth
rates (Table 4), the contribution of ICT sector TFP growth to aggregate TFP growth in Poland
between 1995-2001 would amount to 0.05 of a percentage point, that is slightly less than the
0.09 contribution based on the gross output methodology. 
Table 4: Annual TFP growth and real changes in value added, gross capital stock and labour









Total manufacturing 7,83 4,37 - 1,99 6,82
Office machinery and computers (30) 29,74 7,63 5,58 20,18
Electrical machinery and apparatus
n.e.c. (31) 10,83 5,49 - 0,37 8,55
Radio, TV and communication
equipment (32) 15,24 0,04 - 6,61 17,87
Medical, precision and optical
instruments (33) 11,82 2,99 0,46 11,87
Source: own estimates based on various editions of the „Yearbooks of Industry Statistics” published by Poland’s
Central Statistical Office. 
Very high TFP growth rates in the ICT sector presented in Table 4 raise however some
doubts as to their viability, particularly as regards quite low growth rates in the value of gross
capital stock. It is quite unlikely that such high TFP growth rates were only due to
organizational changes and higher managerial efficiency related to inflows of FDI (Thomson,
Philips, LG etc), without any sizable increase in capital investments. It is also worth
mentioning, that the data from Central Statistical Office – as opposed to US data – does not
use the hedonic deflator to deflate output of the ICT sector. If it were possible to use hedonic
deflator, TFP growth rates would even be higher. This would be hard to explain. Hence,
future research should focus on either elucidating the exact methodology underlying the
official data or on constructing one’s own measures of the value of fixed capital stock on the
basis of data on gross fixed capital investments on the industry level.
Nonetheless, in the context of this paper, both methodologies provide evidence for high
TFP growth rates in ICT sector in the CEE countries. It implies that an increase in the size of12
the sector would have strongly positive implications for growth in aggregate TFP. Hence, the
ICT sector could considerably contribute to faster labour productivity and GDP growth.
3.3 The Contribution of ICT Capital
As on the right hand-side of the equation (2) the contribution of ICT investment to output
growth can be defined as a sum of contributions from ICT capital ( t C
∧
), non-ICT capital ( 0 ˆ K )
and labor (L ˆ ), where weights vICT, v0, and vL represent the nominal shares of ICT capital, non-
ICT capital, and labor, respectively, and sum to one. Total factor productivity (TFP) is
represented in the Hicks neutral or output-augmenting form by parameter A. Symbol 
∧
indicates the rate of change.
A L v K v C v Y L t ICT ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
0 0 + + + =
∧
  (8)
The contribution of ICT capital to labour productivity can be in turn measured based on
equation (3). Yet, ICT investment directly impacts output and labour productivity growth not
only through the increase in capital stock available to the employed in an economy: it also
adds to growth through the increase in the quality of capital as - due to high depreciation and
rapid decrease in prices of ICT - ICT capital has higher marginal rates of return than non-ICT
capital. Hence, ICT investment enhances the quality of growth as any increase in the share of
ICT capital in the overall capital stock results in higher growth of output (Jorgenson 2001).
12
Vu (2004, p. 11) argues that “ICT is superior to the conventional capital in fostering growth.
For a given increases in capital stock (measured in $) and labor, a 10% increase in the ratio
between ICT and non-ICT forms in capital stocks adds about 0.4 to 0.6 percentage points to
GDP growth”. From this point of view, ICT investments are much more productive than
investments in other assets (real estate, means of transport etc.).
Tables 5 and 6 show the size of ICT capital contribution to GDP and labour productivity
growth in CEE countries, EU-15 and in the US during 1995-2001. In this period the ICT
capital contribution in CEE countries, in spite of much lower levels of GDP and labour
productivity per capita, was in absolute terms only slightly lower than the EU average.
However, ICT capital contribution to growth in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and was
higher than in the EU-15. Russia and Romania reported the lowest contributions. This is due
to low value of ICT capital stock in both countries and lower growth rates in ICT investment
than in the other CEE countries. As argued later, slower diffusion of ICT in Romania and
Russia seems to be related to low quality of economic, institutional and regulatory
infrastructure.
                                                
12 The increase in the quality of capital can be metaphorically explained when thinking about the difference in
filling up a car tank with either low or high octane gasoline. The latter, here representing ICT capital, burns uch
faster and more effectively than the low octane gasoline. Hence, by increasing the share of high-octane gasoline
in the total stock of gas in a car tank, the capacity and power of the engine increases, i.e. GDP growth
accelerates. 13
Table 5: The contribution of ICT capital to GDP growth in CEE countries, UE-15 and the










CEE-8 2,67 0,47 0,48 -0,27 1,98 18,0%
Bulgaria  0,51 -0,89 0,45 -0,60 1,55 88,4%
Czech Republic 2,27 1,20 0,73 -0,28 0,62 32,2%
Hungary 3,64 0,37 0,71 0,18 2,38 19,4%
Poland 4,81 1,98 0,55 0,23 2,05 11,5%
Romania 0,79 0,08 0,22 -1,35 1,84 28,3%
Russia 1,12 -0,97 0,09 -0,17 2,17 8,3%
Slovakia 4,10 1,15 0,55 -0,35 2,75 13,5%
Slovenia 4,10 0,87 0,54 0,20 2,49 13,1%
USA 3,52 0,75 0,82 0,90 0,82 23,2%
EU-15 2,42 0,81 0,46 0,84 0,46 18,8%
Note: Unweighted average for the eight CEE countries, including Russia.
Source: Timmer et al. (2003) for the EU and the US. Own estimates for CEE countries based on extended results
from Piatkowski (2003b), which cover additional year 2001. 
Table 6: The contribution of ICT capital to labour productivity growth in CEE countries, UE-










CEE-8 3,27 0,78 0,50 1,98 16%
Bulgaria  1,91 -0,13 0,49 1,55 26%
Czech Republic 2,80 1,43 0,75 0,62 27%
Hungary 3,25 0,17 0,71 2,38 22%
Poland 4,45 1,82 0,58 2,05 13%
Romania 3,55 1,45 0,26 1,84 7%
Russia 1,66 -0,64 0,13 2,17 8%
Slovakia 4,76 1,44 0,57 2,75 12%
Slovenia 3,75 0,73 0,54 2,49 14%
USA 2,21 0,42 0,74 1,05 34%
EU-15 1,13 0,41 0,41 0,31 36%
Note: Unweighted average for the eight CEE countries, including Russia. Labour productivity defined as GDP
growth per person employed.
Source: Van Ark and Piatkowski (2004). Results for Russia based on extended results from Piatkowski (2003b).
The high contribution of ICT capital to GDP and labour productivity growth in CEE
countries resulted mostly from rapid real growth rates in ICT investment, which between
1995 and 2001 were increasing at a rate between 25% and 36% per year, with the exception
of Russia, which recorded only 18% average growth rate (extended results based on
Piatkowski 2003b). The same growth rates for the EU and the US were much lower at 18.5%
an 19.3%, respectively (van Ark and Piatkowski 2004). Fast growth in ICT investments had a
considerable impact on output growth in CEE countries in spite of low share of ICT capital14
compensation in total factor input compensation: during 1995-2001 it ranged from 1.78% in
Poland to 2.82% in the Czech Republic (extended results based on Piatkowski 2003b) versus
the EU-15 and the US average of 3.0% and 5.4%, respectively (Van Ark et al. 2002).
Fast growth in ICT investments in CEE countries was stimulated by:
a) Rapidly declining prices of ICT, which encouraged firms to substitute ICT investment for
non-ICT investments
b) Large pent-up demand for ICT stemming from low level of development of ICT
infrastructure and ICT penetration, which was a legacy of technological backwardness and
low ICT investment intensity from before 1989
13 
c) Significant opportunities for utilization of ICT in economic restructuring,
d) Cultural impact of globalization and the „new economy” hype, which stimulated changes
change in consumption and investment patterns towards increase in outlays on ICT.
High absolute contribution of ICT capital to output and labour productivity growth in the
five leading CEE countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia)
provides evidence that ICT capital contributed to the convergence process with the EU
countries. 
Relative ICT capital contribution in CEE countries is however much lower than in the EU
and the US. As already explained earlier, if it were possible to disentangle the one-off positive
productivity effects, which raised GDP and productivity growth rates during 1995-2001, the
relative ICT capital contribution to growth in CEE countries would be much higher. Hence,
the convergence or catching-up hypothesis would still be valid.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between ICT capital contribution to labour productivity
and GDP per person employed in CEE, EU and the US. It turns out that there is a relatively
strong correlation between both values for the CEE countries, but much weaker one for the
EU and the US. This may suggest that for the CEE countries, where the economic
restructuring is still in full swing, investments in ICT can have a considerable contribution to
acceleration in labour productivity, particularly in the manufacturing sector.
                                                
13 It is worth remembering that until 1990/1991 any imports of ICT products from NATO countries to the CEE
countries, members of the Warsaw military pact, were restricted under the so-called COCOM (Coordinating
Committee) agreement.15
Figure 4: Contribution of ICT capital to labour productivity growth versus GDP per
person employed in CEE, EU-15 and the US, 1999 $EKS, average 1995-2001
Source: data for all countries except for Russia based on van Ark and Piatkowski (2004) and GGDC database.
Russia based on extended results of Piatkowski (2003b).
In turn, as argued by van Ark and Piatkowski (2004), the lack of correlation for the EU-15
and the US between the level of income and economic effects of ICT investments suggests
that the most developed countries are not in a position to increase productivity growth rates in
the manufacturing sector thanks to ICT as most of these industries are already at the global
technological frontier. Thus, any impact of ICT on labour productivity would have to rely on
an increase in productivity in the service sector. This however requires deep changes in the
organizational structure of firms, in managerial methods, innovation processes, and in quality
of human capital.
14 In this context, EU countries are quite different. Hence, it can be argued
that the convergence process in its first phase mainly relies on the increase in productivity in
the manufacturing sector. In the second phase, however, all increase in aggregate productivity
will be dependent on the ability of the service sector to productively use ICT (van Ark and
Piatkowski 2004).
Aside from the growth accounting, the role of ICT capital in stimulating GDP growth can
be estimated on the basis of econometric regression analysis on a large sample of countries.
This kind of analysis allows for testing of causality between ICT investments and GDP
growth. Vu (2004) in his regression analysis for 50 countries finds that a 10% increase in the
real value of ICT capital contributes additional 0.6 percentage points to GDP growth. This
                                                
14 Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996, 2000) show that those US firms, which proved to use ICT most productively,
have made substantial changes in management of operations and invested in enhancing the quality of ICT skills
of employees. OECD (2004) reaches similar conclusions on the basis of a number of firm-level studies in the
OECD countries.16
result provides further evidence that ICT capital can play an important role in acceleration of
growth and consequently in stimulating the convergence process.
A small number of countries in this paper’s sample and relatively short time series do not
allow for meaningful statistical testing. Nonetheless, it is possible to measure the strength of
correlation between average real increase in ICT investments and GDP growth during 1995-
2001 (Figure 5). It transpires that the correlation at the level of 0.25 is not statistically
significant. This may suggest that if Vu’s (2004) results are viable the positive ICT capital
contribution to growth in CEE countries, EU and the US must have been offset by negative
impact of other factors or the lack of statistical relationship is due to low value of the
accumulated ICT capital stock. Further research is needed to elucidate the relation between
ICT capital and growth.17
Figure 5: Relationship between real growth in ICT investments and GDP growth in CEE,
EU-15 and US, 1995-2001 average
Source: Timmer et al. (2003) for the EU and the US. Own estimates based on Piatkowski (2003b) for the CEE
countries. Correlation coefficient: 0.25
3.4 Contribution of Spillover Effects of ICT Production and Use
ICT can add to growth also through the so-called spillover effects of ICT production and
use. Spillover effects can be defined as acceleration in TFP growth on either macro, industry
or micro level due to indirect productivity-stimulating effects of ICT production and/or use.
The end of the decade of the 1990’s was fraught with speculations about the “extraordinary”
characteristics of ICT, utilization of which was believed to indirectly increase TFP growth
There were also efforts to link the increase in TFP growth in the US, Australia, Sweden,
Canada and Denmark with rapidly growing ICT investments (OECD 2001, Pilat and Woelfl
2003).
Moreover, Pilat and Lee (2001) argued that the increase in TFP growth in the ICT-using
service sector in the second half of the 1990’s might have been related to the spillover effects
of the ICT use. Similar arguments were put forth by Oliner and Sichel (2000), Council of
Economic Advisors (2001) and – on the firm level – Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) and
Gandal et al. (1999).
However, the neoclassical economics does not allow for existence of spillover effects. It
assumes that TFP growth is exogenous and hence it can not be related with any of the
production factors. This assumption can be verified as long as it would be possible to prove
that the use or production of ICT led to an increase in TFP growth. If there is no increase,
then either ICT has no impact on TFP, so the spillover effects do not exist, or the positive
contribution of ICT was more than offset by negative impact of other factors.
However, if there is an increase in TFP growth rate on any level, then it may suggest that
there may exist some spillover effects related to ICT. Regression analysis is one of the best
ways of testing for the existence of spillover effects of ICT. Until today, however, due to18
insufficiently long data series on ICT investments on macro or industry-level, there are only a
few studies, which endeavored to estimate these effects. On the macro level, Vu (2004) in his
regression analysis of fifty countries for the years 1990-2000 did not find any evidence for
spillover effects of ICT use. He showed that there were no statistically significant relationship
between ICT investments and TFP growth. Gordon (2000), Schreyer (2000) and IMF (2001)
arrived at similar conclusions. No other reliable and conclusive evidence for the existence of
the spillover effects has been since presented. Even the proponents of the ICT spillovers
admit that there is not enough data to evidence their existence (OECD 2003, 2004, Pilat and
Woelfl 2003).
Figure 6, based on data from Timmer et al. (2003) and Piatkowski (2003b) that there is a
negative correlation between average TFP growth between 1995-2001 and ICT spending
measured as share of GDP (based on WITSA 2002) in CEE countries, EU and the US. It then
seems that either spillover effects indeed do not exist, or that the value of ICT capital stock is
still too small to bear on TFP.
Figure 6: Relationship between ICT spending intensity (as % of GDP) and TFP growth in
CEE, EU-15 and the US, 1995-2001 average19
Source: WITSA (2002) for ICT spending. Timmer et al. (2003) for the EU and the US, extended results of
Piatkowski (2003b) for CEE countries. Correlation coefficient: -0.33
On the industry level, Stiroh (2002b) in his econometric study for 60 US industries for the
years 1973-99 does not find any evidence for spillover effects of ICT use in terms of faster
TFP growth. It turns out that the whole increase in labour productivity can be explained by
changes in traditional sources of growth, i.e. increase in value of available capital.
15 No other
                                                
15 Stiroh (2002b) and OECD (2004) present a useful literature review on spillover effects.20
studies have found any evidence for industry level spillover effects, although OECD (2004)
finds that in the US and Australia sectors that intensively invested in ICT, like wholesale and
retail trade, have reported an increase in the TFP growth rates. In Italy, Milana and Zeli
(2004) found that TFP growth is positively affected by the increased intensity of ICT use on
the industry level. This might suggest the existence of spillover effects of ICT. The evidence
is however not conclusive as all the above studies have failed to prove the causality.
Nevertheless, in spite of the lack of quantitative evidence, it is quite possible that spillover
effects do exist, yet traditional economic methods do not succeed in measuring them. Perhaps
at this stage of its development, the science of economics can not yet cope with that kind of a
challenge. It can be argued that spillover effects of ICT can stimulate faster productivity
growth in the following ways, which so far has escaped measurement:
a) First of all, ICT – thanks to the emergence of global communication networks
(Internet), which allow for faster production, diffusion, and sharing of knowledge –
contribute to faster pace of innovation, which in turn leads to an increase in
productivity growth rates.
16 In addition, ICT accelerate diffusion of existing
knowledge through stimulating imitation, adoption and diffusion of business models,
ideas and through improving access to information;
b)  Secondly, ICT tend to stimulate changes in business models and increased investments
in human capital at the firm level. These positively contribute to increase in
productivity
17; 
c) Thirdly, ICT – similarly to earlier technological revolutions based on general-purpose
technologies (electricity, combustion engine) – may in future find yet unknown
applications, which could enhance overall productivity growth.
18 Investments in ICT
thus seem to come with an embedded option, which can be realized in future through
utilization of ICT for new purposes going beyond the original applications.
19 In this
sense, ICT investments are entirely different from investment in other types of assets
(real estate, machinery, means of transport etc.), since their potential for new
applications is dramatically smaller. From this point of view, investments in ICT are
much superior to investments in alternative assets.
In spite of lacking economic evidence for spillover effects, ICT seem to represent
significant potential for faster growth and hence accelerated catching-up. In line with progress
in availability of data and emergence of new methods of economic testing, more exact
estimation of spillover effects may be possible.
                                                
16 Global R&D networks provide a useful example for knowledge sharing made possible by Internet. Twenty
years ago this kind of collaboration would be considered almost fanciful.
17 It is not possible to introduce, for instance, “just-in-time” procurement based on ICT systems without changes
in firm’s organization and structure and additional training for its employees. Introduction of ICT thus stimulates
changes, which are most often positive for the overall productivity of not only the procurement department, but
also the whole firm (ICT systems accelerate the speed of information sharing, facilitate access to information,
drives cost-cutting initiatives etc.). 
18 The history of steam engine is a fitting example. The original purpose of steam engines was nothing but to
perpetuate pumps, which drained water from underground coal shafts. Only much later the potential of steam
engines was fully realized in transport, manufacturing and almost every other aspects of economic and social
life. ICT seem to have the same extraordinary potential, which is still far from being fully discovered.  
19 Up until 1990’s computers were used in firms mostly to perform various back-office operations. Since then,
however, thanks to the Internet, computers could be used for entirely new applications: electronic supply chains,
customer relationship management, e-commerce etc.21
As for the CEE countries, given current relatively low level of ICT penetration (Internet,
computer, telephone, IT systems, software packages etc.), any spillover effects, even if
existing, are not likely to be significant (Piatkowski 2004). Nonetheless, their potential will be
growing in tandem with an increase in ICT penetration and use.
4. Total Contribution of ICT to Growth and its Determinants
Table 7 and 8 and Figure 7 and 8 show first available estimates of total impact of ICT on
output growth and labour productivity in CEE countries, EU and the US during 1995-2001.
ICT had a large role in stimulating growth in CEE countries, yet its impact was still smaller
than the impact of other non-ICT capital, labour force and TFP. It is however worth noticing
that the contribution of ICT to growth in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia was higher than the EU-15 average. This suggests that in these countries ICT have
contributed to an acceleration in the convergence process and consequently to the catching-up
with the EU countries. However, in the case of Bulgaria, Romania and Russia, the
contribution of ICT to growth was much lower than both in the other CEE countries and the
EU-15 average. Hence, in these countries ICT led to a divergence in growth and to a slow-
down in catching-up with the more developed countries.
Table 7: Total contribution of ICT to GDP growth in CEE countries, EU-15 and the US,

















Bulgaria 0,51 -0,89 0,45 -0,60 1,55 - 0,45 88%
Czech
Republic 2,27 1,20 0,73 -0,28 0,62 0,13 0,86 38%
Hungary 3,64 0,37 0,71 0,18 2,38 0,58 1,29 35%
Poland 4,81 1,98 0,55 0,23 2,05 0,14 0,70 14%
Romania 0,79 0,08 0,22 -1,35 1,84 - 0,22 28%
Russia 1,12 -0,97 0,09 -0,17 2,17 - 0,09 8%
Slovakia 4,10 1,15 0,55 -0,35 2,75 0,09 0,64 16%
Slovenia 4,10 0,87 0,54 0,20 2,49 - 0,54 13%
CEE-8 2,67 0,47 0,47 -0,27 1,98 0,24 0,60 22%
EU-15 2,42 0,81 0,46 0,84 0,46 0,27 0,73 30%
USA 3,52 0,75 0,82 0,9 0,82 0,44 1,26 36%
Source: own estimates for the CEE countries. Timmer et al. (2003) for the EU-15 and the US.22
Figure 7: Total contribution of ICT to GDP growth in CEE countries, EU-15 and the US,
1995-2001 average (in % points)
Note: Results for Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Slovenia do not take into account the contribution of TFP
growth in ICT sector to aggregate TFP. Yet, given a small size of this sector in all countries in question, any
contribution would not significant. „Non-ICT contribution”: contribution from non-ICT capital, TFP growth in
non-ICT sector and changes in labour force.
Source: own estimates for CEE countries. Timmer et al. (2003) for the EU and the US. 
Similar conclusions could be drawn from a comparison of the total ICT contribution to labour
productivity growth. Among the leading five CEE countries, in three of them the contribution
of ICT to growth in labour productivity was higher than the EU average (in Slovakia and
Slovenia the ICT contribution was slightly lower). Yet, Bulgaria, Romania and Russia
distinctly lag behind (Table 8 and Figure 8)
Table 8: Total contribution of ICT to labour productivity (LP) growth in CEE countries, EU-
















Bulgaria 1,91 -0,13 0,49 1,55 0,00 0,49 26%
Czech
Republic 2,80 1,43 0,75 0,62 0,13 0,88 32%
Hungary 3,25 0,17 0,71 2,38 0,58 1,29 40%
Poland 4,45 1,82 0,58 2,05 0,14 0,72 16%
Romania 3,55 1,45 0,26 1,84 0,00 0,26 7%
Russia 1,66 -0,64 0,13 2,17 0,00 0,13 8%
Slovakia 4,76 1,44 0,57 2,75 0,09 0,66 14%
Slovenia 3,75 0,73 0,54 2,49 0,00 0,54 14%
CEE-8 3,27 0,78 0,50 1,98 0,12 0,62 19%
EU-15 1,13 0,41 0,41 0,31 0,27 0,68 60%
USA 2,21 0,42 0,74 1,05 0,44 1,18 53%23
Source: as in Table 7.
Figure 8: Total contribution of ICT to labour productivity growth in CEE countries, EU-15
and the US, 1995-2001 average (in % points)
Note: as in Figure 7. „Non-ICT” comprises contribution of non-ICT capital and increase n TFP in non-ICT
producing sector. 
Source: as in Figure 7.
What factors led to such a divergence in the impact of ICT on output and labour
productivity growth in CEE countries?  The impact of ICT is likely to be dependent on the
quality and level of development of economic, institutional and regulatory framework of an
economy. This framework seems to largely determine the speed of ICT diffusion and the
extent of its productive use. The quality of the economic, institutional and regulatory
framework can be assessed on a basis of the “New Economy Indicator” (NEI) developed by
Piatkowski (2002). The “NEI” is aimed at measuring the level of preparedness of countries to
benefit from ICT to accelerate output and productivity growth.
Table 10 in the Appendix shows an updated „New Economy Indicator” based on van Ark
and Piatkowski (2004). It compares the level of development of the economic, institutional
and regulatory framework in the CEE countries, EU-15 and the US. The “NEI” ranking
confirms that in the five leading CEE countries, where ICT has had the largest contribution to
growth, the level of development and quality of economic and institutional infrastructure was
considerably higher than in the remaining three CEE countries (Bulgaria, Romania and
Russia). A relatively strong correlation (0.46) between the value of the “NEI” and the average
contribution of ICT capital to labour productivity growth between 1995-2001 provides
evidence that the economic, institutional and regulatory factors have a large bearing on the
use of ICT (Figure 9). It then can be argued that a continuous improvement in the quality of
institutions and regulations, increase in trade openness and macroeconomic stability,
enhanced labour and product market competition as well as the size of outlays on human
capital and R&D are prerequisites to absorption and productive use of ICT in order to shorten
the distance in level of development relative to the EU countries. Kolodko (2003) provides
similar arguments.
The importance of institutions, regulations and macroeconomic stability for diffusion of
ICT is also confirmed by a fact that the NEI seems to have a relatively strong predictive24
power: the correlation between the value of NEI in 1995 and the average ICT capital
contribution to labour productivity during 1995-2001 amounts to 0.55.
Figure 9: Relationship between ICT capital contribution to labour productivity growth and
the value of the „New Economy Indicator”, 1995-2001 average
Source: based on van Ark and Piatkowski (2004).
Other studies on the determinants of productive use of ICT call attention to the same
variables as in the NEI: quality of human capital, quality of law enforcement, trade openness,
level of competition, direct costs of ICT products, size of foreign direct investments and the
level of liberalization of the telecom markets (Pohjola 2003, Clarke 2003, OECD 2003, 2004)
5. What is the Potential of ICT for Long-term Growth in CEE Countries?
Assuming that the overall business environment in CEE countries will steadily improve,
and on the basis on the growth accounting model based on Piatkowski (2003b), one can
venture to speculate about the contribution of ICT to growth in CEE countries until 2025
taking Poland as a proxy for the five leading CEE countries (Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovakia and Slovenia). For the purposes of the exercise, which is aimed at projecting the
potential impact of ICT rather than future GDP growth trends, the following assumptions will
be taken (all assumptions for Poland only):
1. Employment will grow by 0.5% annually until 2025. This would translate – ceteris
paribus – into the unemployment level of 7% at the end of the period.
2. Depreciation rate for non-ICT capital: 7.5% annually; for IT hardware, software and
communications equipment: 29.5%, 31.5% and 11.5%, respectively.
3. Labor compensation share in total income to amount to 65% throughout the period 
4. TFP growth: 1.5% annually (versus 2,05% on average during 1995-2001). 25
5. ICT hedonic price deflator: prices of IT hardware, software and communications
equipment until 2025 will decrease at an average hedonic rate equal to the 1990-2001
average rate for the US, that is, respectively, 20.7%, 1.3% and 3.2% annually.
20
6. Non-ICT deflator: 3% annual growth.
7. Increase in real investments in ICT (before deflation with hedonic price index): 5, 10%
and 15% annually.
8. Increase in real non-ICT investments: 5% annually.
Table 9 shows the projected average contribution of ICT capital to output growth in Poland
during 2002-25. Depending on the assumed rate of growth in real ICT investments (before
price adjustment for changes in quality), the ICT capital would contribute between 0.35 to
0.85 of a percentage point to GDP growth in the period. In the base scenario, assuming a 10%
rate of growth in ICT investments, ICT capital would contribute 0.6 of a percentage point or
15% of the projected GDP growth
Table 9: Projected ICT capital contribution to GDP growth in Poland for the years 2002-



















5% 3,76 1,94 1,59 0,35 0,32 1,50 9,3%
10% 4,01 2,19 1,59 0,60 0,32 1,50 15,0%
15% 4,26 2,43 1,59 0,85 0,32 1,50 20,0%
Note: * before adjustment for hedonic price changes of ICT investments.
Source: own estimates
The projection does not take into account the contribution of TFP growth in ICT producing
sector to aggregate TFP and potential spillover effects of ICT production and use.
21 If
contribution of the former was taken into account, the total contribution of ICT to growth
would most likely surpass 20% of the projected growth rates. This would also most likely be
the case for the four other leading CEE countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and
Slovenia. In the case of the three lagging countries – Bulgaria, Romania and Russia – the
contribution of ICT capital to growth, based on the historical trends, is likely to be smaller
than for the other CEE countries. Yet, more precise projections are hardly possible since
future rates of growth in ICT and non-ICT capital until 2025 will be dependant on a large
number of factors, including the quality of economic policy, which is impossible to predict ex
ante.
                                                
20  During 1995-2001 hedonic prices of ICT (IT hardware, software and communications equipment) were
declining at an average annual rate of 25.4%, 1.0% and 4.4%, respectively (Jorgenson et al. 2002). However, a
more conservative pace of price decline was assumed, which was to equal the 1990-2001 average, which
comprised two periods of both faster and slower price declines.
21 However, since projections on the future of ICT industry in CEE countries are burdened with large risk, any
assumptions as to the size and TFP growth rate in the ICT sector until 2025 would not be more than a pure
speculation. Nonetheless, it could be argued that ICT sector – in line with the increasing penetration of ICT –
should be growing faster in the CEE countries than the rest of the economy.26
The projected average GDP growth rate of approx. 4% per annum (Orłowski 2002 projects
the same GDP growth rate for Poland until 2025) will be mostly dependent on the rate of
growth in TFP. So far, high TFP growth rates in Poland and in other CEE countries were
mostly driven by easy-to-utilize post-transition growth reserves stemming from deep
structural reforms (privatization, liquidation of unproductive state-owned enterprises, inflows
of FDI), elimination of wastage in the use of resources as well as shortages in the offer
products and services, large pent-up demand for consumer products, revolution in the
managerial and business skills and a largely completed process of institution building. The
positive impact on productivity is particularly visible in labour productivity statistics for the
manufacturing sector: for instance in Poland between 1993 and 2001 labour productivity
growth in ICT using industries amounted to 11.3% annually (van Ark and Piatkowski 2004).
Such a high rate of productivity growth was mostly due to reductions in the labour force and
relatively easy to achieve replacement of old machinery with new, state-of-the art equipment.
However, these reserves of productivity growth are by now mostly exhausted. In the next
twenty years TFP growth will then have to rely on further restructuring of the manufacturing
sector and – above all – of the service sector, which generates more than 60% of GDP in all
the leading CEE countries. In both sectors, the restructuring is doomed to fail without an
ability to productively use ICT. Hence, long term growth in TFP (and hence in GDP) will
have to result from increase in ICT investments and an ability to benefit from ICT through
changes in firms’ business and organizational models and increase in the quality and level of
ICT skills of the labour force.
It seems that firms investing in ICT need time to learn to use ICT productively. The US
experienced a boom in labour productivity only in the latter part of the 1990’s, some twenty
years after the beginning of a wave of large investments in ICT. Until the late 1990’s the
Solow’s (1987) famous “productivity paradox” still seemed to be valid. Adoption of
electricity, another revolutionary general purpose technology, exhibited a similar pattern
(David 1990): it was only in the 1920’s – forty years after the discovery of electricity – that
more than half of American companies learned to use electricity in production processes. Still
more time was needed to fully benefit from the new technology. When it was finally
achieved, similarly as was the case in the late 1990’s with ICT, the long awaited acceleration
in productivity arrived.
It seems very likely that, in line with the growth in ICT penetration, a similar sequence of
events could unfold in the case of the five leading CEE economies. This time, however,
thanks to much higher level of openness and development of the Internet, which immensely
facilitates the exchange and sharing of knowledge, the learning process of ICT use in the CEE
countries may be shorter than it was the case with the early adopters in the developed
countries. Taking into account that enterprises in the CEE countries started their ICT
investments in earnest at around 1995, it may be projected that within the following fifteen
years, that is around 2010, ICT investments should finally start to strongly feed into the
productivity statistics.
Such a positive scenario is by no means given. The economic potential of ICT will be
dependent on continued large investments in ICT and – even more importantly – on the
ability to incorporate ICT into the business models. Investments in ICT also bring an
opportunity for increase in productivity thanks to emergence of new, more productive uses
ICT, which would allow shortening of production cycles, increase in effectiveness of supply
and distribution channels and quality and choice of products and services. Investments in ICT
are also likely to contribute to productivity growth through spillover effects of ICT use, which27
– although still elusive in terms of their quantitative impact – are likely to be increasingly
tangible.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations for Economic Policy
ICT had a large contribution to GDP and labour productivity growth in CEE countries.
During 1995-2001 ICT – through increase in the value of ICT capital and TFP growth in ICT
producing sector – brought on average 0.87 of a percentage point of output growth in the four
CEE countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), the only countries for which
sufficient data was available. The aggregate contribution of ICT in these countries was higher
than the EU-15 average of 0.73 of a percentage point. This suggests that ICT has contributed
to a convergence process between these CEE countries and the EU-15.
ICT capital alone contributed on average 0.61 of a percentage point to output growth in the
five leading CEE countries - Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia –
substantially higher than the EU-15 average of 0.46. The large contributions of ICT capital
seem to be higher than what one might expect on the basis of the level of GDP or productivity
per capita. There are however substantial differences among the CEE countries: the
contribution of ICT capital to output growth in Bulgaria, Romania, and Russia was much
lower than in the leading CEE countries and also lower than in the EU average. Similar
pattern emerges from the comparison of the contribution of ICT capital to labour productivity
growth. Hence, in the case of the three lagging CEE countries, ICT seems to have led to a
divergence rather than convergence with the income levels in the EU-15.
Since the easy-to-utilize post-transition growth reserves have been by now mostly
exhausted, it seems that the future growth in the CEE economies will have to be largely
dependent on an ability to productively use ICT. According to the projection developed in this
study, in Poland the ICT capital is likely to contribute 0.6 of a percentage point of an average
GDP growth of 4% until 2025. This projection however does not take into account
opportunities for finding new, more productive application for ICT, which could further lift
the contribution of ICT to growth and productivity.
ICT are also likely to stimulate productivity growth through the so-called spillover effects.
Thanks to ICT, which dramatically accelerate the pace of innovation and diffusion of
knowledge, firms, industries and whole economies will stand a chance to accelerate
productivity growth through imitation and absorption of concepts, models and ideas
developed in other, more advanced countries.
However, ICT will not be productively utilized without changes in the structure,
organization and business models of firms and without improvement in ICT skills of the
labour force. On the macro level, as indicated by the “New Economy Indicator”, ICT is not
likely to rapidly diffuse without consistent progress in economic, institutional, and regulatory
infrastructure. 
In order to fully benefit from ICT, economic policies should focus on creating friendly
business environment, opening borders to trade, increasing inflows of foreign capital and
spending on human capital, improving effectiveness of law enforcement, enhancing
macroeconomic stability and – above all – promoting vigorous competition in the labour and
product markets. 
As for more specific recommendations, development of public e-services could have
considerable contribution to stimulation of the use of ICT among firms and individuals.
Similarly, universal use of online public procurement platforms would not only bring savings28
to the public administration, decrease bureaucracy and the scope for corruption, but would
also galvanize interest of firms in using more advanced ICT applications (like, for instance, e-
commerce) also in the private sector. Public e-procurement could then have sizable spillover
effects.29
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Sweden 1 9.882 0.818 1.724 -0.067 0.541 2.273 1.884 0.334 0.641 1.257 0.476
Netherlands 2 8.001 1.035 0.765 0.975 1.197 0.513 -0.195 1.099 0.641 1.600 0.370
Denmark 3 7.331 0.914 1.439 -0.278 -0.217 0.614 2.453 0.898 0.641 0.462 0.404
Ireland 5 6.210 0.977 0.710 -0.716 1.395 0.393 -0.403 0.634 1.539 1.283 0.397
UK 4 6.343 0.830 0.300 2.102 0.554 -0.262 -0.213 0.245 1.240 1.228 0.318
Belgium 6 5.624 0.254 0.257 1.843 0.253 0.467 0.810 0.161 0.142 1.006 0.430
Finland 9 4.857 0.754 1.260 -1.615 1.510 1.201 -0.239 1.098 1.040 -0.540 0.387
Austria 8 5.021 1.108 0.439 0.163 0.840 0.283 0.643 1.095 0.641 -0.625 0.433
USA 7 5.162 1.109 1.268 -0.355 -0.271 1.544 1.048 -0.687 0.342 0.744 0.420
Germany 10 3.105 0.720 0.526 -0.708 1.166 0.928 -0.416 0.120 0.641 -0.319 0.446
Portugal 11 2.076 0.215 -0.187 -0.347 0.854 -0.860 0.422 0.902 0.342 0.390 0.345
France 12 1.340 0.160 0.410 -0.929 0.439 0.784 0.659 -0.509 -0.057 -0.083 0.466
Slovenia 13 -0.180 -0.406 -0.243 0.925 -0.865 -0.054 0.540 0.445 0.442 -0.930 -0.034
Czech Rep. 14 -1.060 -0.482 -0.714 1.148 -0.043 -0.309 -0.485 0.711 -0.856 -0.218 0.187
Hungary 15 -2.163 -0.202 -0.880 0.483 -1.029 -0.792 -0.331 0.295 0.442 0.085 -0.233
Italy 17 -3.141 0.244 -0.282 -0.797 0.477 -0.647 -0.499 -2.182 0.442 -0.255 0.358
Spain 16 -3.102 -0.273 0.199 -0.890 -0.072 -0.468 -0.298 -0.488 -0.257 -0.942 0.386
Greece 18 -5.399 -0.382 -0.117 -0.936 -0.527 -0.946 -1.409 -0.240 -0.157 -0.975 0.290
Slovakia 19 -5.670 -1.051 -1.060 1.306 -0.857 -0.717 -0.531 -1.323 -0.856 -0.593 0.012
Poland 20 -7.042 -0.674 -1.352 -0.707 -1.212 -0.828 0.107 -0.616 -1.255 -0.405 -0.099
Bulgaria 21 -10.372 -1.355 -1.197 0.611 -1.284 -0.319 -1.427 -1.470 -1.913 -0.500 -1.517
Romania 22 -12.063 -1.670 -1.653 -0.504 -1.438 -1.025 -1.388 0.482 -1.913 -0.763 -2.191
Russia 23 - 13,375 - 2,643 - 1,610 - 0,711 - 1,411 - 0,574 - 0,974 - 0,582 - 1,913 - 0,907 - 2,049
Source: based on Van Ark and Piatkowski (2004). Russia based on own estimates.